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Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a general element in today's global economy and in particular for those countries in transition to market economies.
1 This is also true for Ukraine, the second-largest economy of the former Soviet Union and a direct neighbor of the European Union, comparing to France both in terms of size and population. The research presented here focuses on FDI in Ukrainian manufacturing. We address these questions by utilizing a large, five-year panel of Ukrainian manufacturing firms. 3 Our analysis is based on a few main concepts concerning the transfer mechanisms and the possible effects of foreign presence in a domestic market. In the case of foreign direct investment in building a new plant or by acquisition of a pre-existing domestic firm, foreign investors may introduce their own technology, business practices, and labor force.
1 For a general overviews of recent developments, see, e.g. Markusen (2002) ; UNCTAD (2000) provides a focus on global cross-border mergers; Moran (1998) reviews FDI in developing and transition economies; Dyker (1999) focuses on FDI and technology transfer in the former Soviet Union. 2 See, e.g., http://www.ukraineinfo.us/business/investment.html.
The same investment activities also "spill over" within the same industry or region and lead to indirect effects on other domestic firms also within that same industry or region. Competitors may be negatively affected by foreign firms' market shares, while at the same time being positively affected by opportunities to copy production processes or product designs from them.
While inward FDI is generally associated with higher domestic productivity 4 , the evidence on presence and direction of indirect effects is rather mixed. Testing for marginal spillovers from FDI in Romania, Altomonte and Pennings (2005) analyze a panel of 10,650 firms for the period 1995 to 2001 and find that domestic firms' total factor productivity reacts positively on initial foreign investment while being affected negatively later on.
The competition effect is found to have both positive and negative impacts. Positive spillovers are found in Canadian and Australian manufacturing industries (Caves, 1974) , and in Indonesian banks (Cho, 1990 ). However, negative effects are observed in Aitken and Harrison (1999) for a panel of 4,000 Venezuelan firms between 1976 and 1989. Higher FDI is associated with lower productivity for completely domestically-owned firms in the same industry. Negative effects are also observed in Belgian manufacturing industries (De Backer and Sleuwagen, 2003) . Using firm-level panel data from Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, Konings (2001) finds that only in Poland do foreign firms outperform domestic firms, while there is evidence of FDI giving rise to negative spillovers (as is the case of Bulgaria and Romania) or no spillovers (as in Poland). He concludes that during earlier stages of transition (e.g. for Bulgaria and Romania) the positive technology spillover effect seems to be dominated by the negative competition effect of FDI, as inefficient domestic firms inevitably lose market share to foreign firms. In later stages of development (as we see in Poland), when domestic firms have started restructuring and market competition has increased, the competition effect seems to disappear. The technology transfer channel has received some justification both theoretically (Blomström, 1987; Blomström and Kokko, 1997) and empirically for the case of Indonesia (Sjöholm, 1999) . 5 However, Blomström and Kokko (2003) present evidence that technological spillovers are not an invariate consequence of FDI. Other highly convincing contrary evidence has also been presented. Aitken and Harrison (1999) introduce controls for local technology spillovers by including foreign-employment shares in per industry and per region analyses. They argue that previous studies found unambiguously positive effects for local technology spillovers and so overstated positive spillovers because multinationals are likely to invest in more productive sectors and firms. When this bias is addressed by including proxies for exogenous productivity differences between regions (i.e. real wage of skilled workers, price of energy), no evidence for technology spillovers to domestic firms is found.
Furthermore, foreign presence within industrial sectors does not have any significant effects on productivity of Czech manufacturing firms (Kinoshita, 2000) or similar firms in the Wroclaw region, Poland (Hardy, 1998) .
If a multinational firm establishes new business relations between upstream suppliers and downstream firms, this can establish backward and forward linkages leading to the transfer or spillover of technological know-how. 6 Within higher aggregated industrial data as we 5 Some preliminary evidence for Russia has also been presented in working papers by Ponomareva (2000) and by Yudaeva et al. (2001) . 6 FDI-induced backward and forward linkages can push industrial development, especially with regard to the formation of small businesses. FDI creates backward linkages, for instance, by foreign firms purchasing local services and subcontracting with domestic firms. and Javorcik/Saggi/Spatareanu (2004) analyze panels of Lithuanian firms (for the years 1996 to 2000) and Romanian firms (for the years 1998 to 2000), respectively, and find evidence for backward linkages. Observing small businesses along the border of Mexico, it is found that the linkage approach reasonably describes the development of small business employment (Brown, 2002) . On the other hand, there is little evidence for both backward and forward linkages for the German-owned manufacturing sector in the northeast of England (Kirchner, 2000) and for Korean FDI in Southeast Asia, (Lee, 1994) .
present it 7 , these linkages may show up as intra-industry effects that are indistinguishable from horizontal technology transfer effects. Therefore, when we refer in our model and in the interpretation of the data to positive spillovers due to technology transfer, we cannot rule out that any effects we find are partly due to backward and forward linkages.
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Other possible spillover channels affecting domestic firms' cost functions may include training effects 9 or demonstration effects 10 . In addition, domestic firms' proximity to multinational enterprises 11 or to other exporters 12 may provide another source of productivity enhancement. Lastly, highly productive firms may be a priori more likely to export: productivity leads to exports 13 . Our data do not allow us to distinguish between all of these different sources of productivity improvements, but we are able to estimate aggregated effects. In summary, based on previous literature discussed we assume that there are two counteracting effects on a domestic firm's incentive to produce or export. However, our literature discussion does not allow us to draw a clear conclusion about which one of these two effects at work will be dominant. In order to answer this question, we present a simple oligopolistic model with technological spillover effects and derive the hypotheses that increases in foreign investments or increases in the number of foreign firms present will indeed increase domestic firms' ex-7 Industries in our data set are classified into 16 categories on the two-digit level; see Table 4 . 8 As argued in Javorcik/Saggi/Spatareanu (2004), many firm-level studies cast doubt on the existence of horizontal spillovers in transition countries while those spillovers may be more likely in developed countries. 9 Training spillovers result from foreign firms investing in human capital. In Mexico, many at the managerial level start their careers in foreign companies and are later employed in domestic firms (Blomström, 1989) . Moreover, domestic firms are afraid of losing their market shares and they too invest in training their workers and managerial personnel (Kinoshita, 1998) . Generally, human capital is an important determinant of the distribution of foreign direct investment in developing countries (Noorbakhsh et al., 2001) . 10 Demonstration effects are potentially very important for many countries and industries according to Blomström and Kokko (1998) . De Backer and Sleuwagen (2003) present an analysis of Belgian manufacturing firms and show evidence of positive long-term demonstration effects. 11 See Javorcik (2004) for Lithuanian manufacturing. Aitken, Hanson and Harrison (1997) , analyzing a panel of 2,100 Mexican manufacturing firms between 1986 and 1990, present evidence that the probability of a domestic firm being an exporter is positively correlated with its proximity to multinational firms. 12 Proximity of domestic firms to other exporters has been shown to have a positive effect on the probability to export for firms in Colombia, Mexico and Morocco (Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998) . 13 Bernard and Jensen (1999, 2004) and durable-goods producers benefit most from foreign presence and investments.
The following section presents the Cournot competition model. The data are described in section 3, while section 4 discusses the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 concludes with a summary and discussion.
Augmented Oligopolistic Competition Model

The Model
We present an oligopolistic-competition model with spillover effects in the cost functions.
Due to cost-reducing spillovers, domestic firms will increase production and export levels in response to increased foreign presence in their industry or their region of residence.
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In the home country economy, there are H n domestic firms and foreign-owned firms F n 15 ; both foreign and domestic firms offer their products in the home market as well as in the foreign market. There are no trade costs and firms produce heterogeneous goods and compete in quantities. We assume that the inverse demand, P i , for a good produced by either a domestic or a foreign firm
is of the form:
In this specification, total demand in each of the two identical markets is
where q H is a representative domestic firm's output per market and q F is a representative for-eign firm's output per market. 16 Marginal production cost of firm i is denoted as c i . Every firm faces variable costs, but also spends j i for R&D investment. Investment j i reduces variable cost by δ i √ j i .
The firm cannot fully protect its stock of knowledge, and so, as a result, the investment spills over to other firms. We denote θ H as a spillover coefficient for funds invested by (n H -1) other domestic firms and ψ H as a spillover coefficient for funds invested by n F foreign firms (FDI). We assume that the more other firms invest, the lower marginal costs of the representative domestic firm are. Spillover parameters for foreign firms, θ F and ψ F are defined analogously.
Representative domestic and foreign firms maximize their profits per market:
Assuming symmetry we receive the following first order conditions:
Solving this system we receive the optimal export 17 quantity, q H , for the domestic firm:
where
This equation relates presence of foreign firms in the industry to the export volume of the representative domestic firm. Taking the derivatives of equation (7) with respect to the number of foreign firms in the industry and the level of investment by foreign firms, we receive:
Entry of an additional foreign firm or increases in investments by foreign firms will have unambiguously positive effects as long as γ is not too close to β and {ψ H , θ H } are large enough
18 This means domestic firms will increase output and thus exports when their product is not too close a substitute to foreign products and the cost-reducing effect from spillovers for domestic firms is not too small relative to spillovers that foreign firms receive themselves.
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Model Parameterization
Equation (7) is not linear in n F , n H , j H , j F , w H or w F . However, after a linear transformation and taking logarithms, we can express the relation from equation (7) in the following simplified form:
0ˆ, , ,
where ^ denotes that all variables are now in (natural) logarithms. For a particular domestic firm i at time t, the variables n and j are numbers of firms and investment per firm, respectively, in the particular industry. Parameterizing as a linear function of regional spillovers, scale variables and export volume at the previous period it w 20 , we receive: We parameterize because we do not have any data on firms' costs. This parameterization can be justified as follows. Every firm has its specific marginal cost, which depends not only on firm characteristics but also on the firm's environment. Marginal cost is higher if the number of potential customers is low or transaction costs are high. Thus, if a firm is surrounded by a richer variety of other firms who also invest in R&D or have some experience of selling the product, then its costs will be lower. 
where 0 Our theoretical model leads us to expect in particular positive signs on ξ . In addition, these parameters may also pick up some training and demonstration effects.
Unfortunately, identifying these latter effects would require additional firm-specific data, such as labor turnover, etc., which was not recorded in the panel.
Data description
We used an unpublished dataset of Ukrainian manufacturing firms to create an unbalanced firm panel for the years 1996 to 2000. 23 The panel consists on a yearly average of 8,500
21 See also Bernar and Bradford (1999) . 22 Foreign-owned firms usually require high quality input materials, which in turn leads to improvements of local material supplies. This is the case e.g. In order to test the effects of spillovers on firms facing similar characteristics, the dataset is split into two categories: large and small firms. A firm is considered to be "large" if its number of workers is above the 75th percentile by year. If a firm's number of workers is below the 25th percentile by year, then it is classified as "small". 28 A two-sample paired t- 24 Because of data restrictions we only investigate exporting firms. We attempted estimations with sales as a dependent variable but received strong misspecification for these models. 25 In our five-year panel, we have a total of 12,112 export observations and a yearly average of 2,422 observations. Export volumes are equal to zero for 40 of these observations. Export volumes for at least four (three) years are reported for 43% (57%) of the firms in the panel. Average export-output and export-sales shares were between 20% and 70% for the years 1996-1998. 26 Export is measured in 1,000s of USD. 27 Supposedly, the data cover all manufacturing production in Ukraine. However, some data might have been lost or withheld. 28 A similar categorization is done by Baum et al. (2003) . To check for potential sample selection issues we created subsamples based on presample values. The results follow the patterns of the reported ones.
test is used to test for the equality of means, and we identify significant differences in the behavior of large and small firms.
Moreover, we investigate the spillover effect for "durable" and "non-durable" goods producers. This classification is based on the dichotomy proposed by Sharpe (1994) : First, we find the correlation between sales and nominal GNP. Second, firms with an average correlation higher than the 60 th percentile are considered as durable goods producers, while firms with correlation on average lower than the 40 th percentile are denoted as non-durable goods producers.
In order to control for agglomeration effects, we consider a subsample we will call "urban" firms located in regions where there are cities with populations of one million or more.
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Compared to the rest of the country's average, all these regions are characterized by much higher volumes of FDI and a higher number of manufacturing firms receiving FDI. For example, on average 112 such firms are located in the Dnipropetrovsk region, which is more than the total of FDI firms in the regions Kherson, Chernivtsi, Chernigiv, Kirovograd, and Volyn together. "Non-urban" firms are located in the remaining regions and will likely demonstrate the effects of non-agglomeration.
From the data distribution by industry (Table 4) , we see that some industries are characterized by high levels of exports but low levels of FDI (e.g. non-ferrous metallurgy) while others are characterized by high levels of both exports and FDI (e.g. ferrous metallurgy).
Regional and Industry-Wide Spillover Effects
We estimated Equation (11) for all firms and several splits of firms, using ordinary least square, fixed-effect, one-step Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), and two-step GMM 29 "Urban" firms are located in Lviv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropertrovsk, Zaporizhzhia regions and Kyiv city.
estimation. 30 The results are given in Tables 5-8 . In all estimations, the dependent variable is the logarithm of exports. The independent variables are number of workers; the number of foreign/home firms in the region; the number of foreign/home firms in the industry; the logarithm of investment of foreign/home firms in the region; the logarithm of investment of foreign/home firms in the industry and the lagged level of the logarithm of export. (Table 5 , column 2). They provide some evidence for positive regional spillovers from FDI, namely that there is a significantly positive impact of foreign presence on exports of firms in that region. This suggests significant linkage effects. There are also significant effects of the number of domestic firms on the volume of exports in the same region (positive) and industry (negative).
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 2002) . 32 The specifications include firm fixed effects, time dummies, and industry dummies. Adding regional dummies, however, would lead to multicollinearity in our specifications. 33 The orthogonal transformation uses
where the transformed variable does not depend on its lagged values. If we use first differences instead of an orthogonal transformation, we will have to instrument with moment restrictions starting from which will lead to dropping an additional 20% of the available data., (Arellano and Bover, 1995) . 2 − t columns (2) and (4) describe two-step estimation.
The correctness of the respective model specification is checked using the Sargan test.
We computed the Sargan test for each two-step GMM model, and we do not receive rejection for overidentifying restrictions. 34 In the analysis for the "all firms" dataset (Table 5 , columns (3) and (4)), we receive evidence for positive industry spillover effects. For instance, the Entry of a foreign firm in an industry increases the exports of a company in that industry by roughly1.2 %. Similarly, Entry of a foreign firm in a particular region raises exports of domestic firms in that region by about 0.6 %. There is also significant evidence for regional spillovers from domestic investment.
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One interesting contrast is observed for the "durable" and "non-durable" goods producers split as described in Table 6 . Results for non-durable firms demonstrate no significant spillover effects from foreign firms at all. On the other hand, the findings show a much stronger trend for durable-goods producers: entry of one foreign firm into the industry increases the level of exports of a domestic firm in that industry by 1.3%, while Entry of one foreign firm in the region increases the level of exports of a domestic firm in the same region by about 0.8 %.
Comparing the results for "small" and "large" firms (Table 7) , one can see that the number of foreign firms in the region does not seem to have any effect on small domestic firms' exports, while there are highly significant (at the 1% level) regional spillovers for large
firms. An increase in the number of foreign firms in the region by one increases a domestic firm's exports by about 1.3 %. Concerning industry spillovers, the number of foreign firms 34 Note: we do not report Sargan test results for one-step GMM results. The Sargan test has an asymptotic chisquared distribution only in the case of homoscedastic error terms. Our dataset is very heteroscedastic so we receive rejection of overidentifying restrictions in most cases. Arellano and Bond (1991) also mention that the Sargan test on the one-step estimation often leads to rejection of the null hypothesis indicating that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. 35 We also reestimated the models in Table 5 using a smaller data set including only firms with at least four observations. The results appear to be robust with respect to foreign presence.
has a significantly positive effect (at the 5 % level) on exports of large firms only. The effect of a domestic firms' presence in the region is positive and significant (at 1%) for large firms only: A one unit rise in the number of domestic firms in the region raises domestic firms' exports by almost 0.8 %. Effects of the number of domestic firms in the industry on large domestic firms' levels of exports are slightly negative. Interestingly, there is a negative coefficient on the lagged dependent variable for small firms and positive for large firms. This could be explained by occasional export opportunities faced by former ones and more persistent by firms with higher number of employees.
The results for "urban" and "non-urban" firms (Table 8) are also quite striking: Firms in both categories are significantly affected by foreign firms' activities. Entry of one foreign firm in the region or in the industry leads to an increase in the level of exports by one to two percent. Similarly, both categories are negatively affected by more domestic competition in the industry. In contrast, the number of domestic firms in the region has a significant effect on volumes of export for "non-urban" firms only. Nevertheless, spillover effects are generally larger (about double) for "urban" firms.
In summary, we find general support for the model's predictions on the effect of industry-wide FDI spillovers for the "all firms" data set. For different categories of firms, we receive support for the model's predictions to varying degrees. The results are stronger for large firms, "urban" firms and durable-goods producers. Large firms can more easily adjust the quality of their production to meet the requirements of foreign firms in the region or even export their products. Similarly, Sinani and Meyer (2002) argue that large firms have more resources to invest in absorbing new technology of foreign firms or to attract better-qualified labor in order to cope with increased competition from foreign firms. Interestingly, Aitken and Harrison (1999) arrive at quite different results. In a study of 4,000 Venezuelan firms, they concluded that only small firms' 36 productivity significantly benefits from FDI, while there is no significant effect on large firms. While we might have expected to see an advantage for firms located in urban areas, our data does not offer any evidence for that. Finally, spillover effects might be more significant for durable-goods producers because this type of production requires higher level of backward and forward linkages within the same industry.
Conclusions
We examined the effects of industry-wide and region-wide spillovers on the optimal level of exports. Based on a simple oligopolistic competition model augmented with spillover effects, we hypothesized that a domestic manufacturing firm's performance, measured by the volume of exports, responds both to industry-wide and region-wide spillover effects. If technological spillover effects are present and large enough, then increased foreign presence should increase the volume of exports of a representative firm as well. To test this hypothesis we utilized a five-year panel-dataset of Ukrainian manufacturing firms including on a yearly average about 2,400 exporters.
Our empirical findings broadly support the notion that foreign direct investments do benefit firms operating in Ukraine. Positive effects are found to be stronger for larger firms and for durable-goods producers. However, since our data did not allow us to distinguish individual firms by ownership, we cannot distinguish direct and indirect effects of FDI. Future research will concentrate on collecting such information and reexamining our data in order to isolate indirect effects indicating spillovers. Similar to the results for a much smaller number of Ukrainian firms presented in , we expect to be able to identify both significant direct and significant spillover effects. Given the high level of aggregation of our data, this would likely also include vertical spillovers due to backwards or forwards link-36 Defined as firms with less than 50 workers.
ages. The task to separate vertical from horizontal spillovers, however, would require more highly disaggregated data. The presence of vertical spillovers due to backwards or forwards linkages could also explain that positive effects are stronger for durable-goods producers, since production of a durable good is likely to require a larger number of backward and forward linkages within both the same industry and region. Keeping data problems mentioned above in mind, our results may nevertheless suggest that measures promoting FDI, such as free-trade zones or tax privileges to foreign investors may indeed benefit Ukrainian firms. Note: (i) p25, p50 and p75 represent the quartiles of the distribution, while σ and μ represent its standard deviation and mean respectively, (ii) F denotes "foreign" and H stands for ``home". Note. (i) Dependent variable: log of export; all independent variables with the exception of numbers of H/F firms in region/industry are in log form, (ii) all equations include industry dummies, time dummies and a constant, (iii) heteroscedastic consistent standard errors in brackets, (iv) *** denotes significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 10% level, (v) instruments include some or all available moment restrictions of the endogenous explanatory variables, (vi) AR(2) is the ArellanoBond test for second order autocorrelation, (vii) all estimations calculated using DPD package for Ox. Note. (i) Dependent variable: log of export; all independent variables with the exception of numbers of H/F firms in region/industry are in log form, (ii) all equations include industry dummies, time dummies and a constant, (iii) heteroscedastic consistent standard errors in brackets, (iv) *** denotes significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 10% level, (v) instruments include some or all available moment restrictions of the endogenous explanatory variables, (vi) AR (2) is the ArellanoBond test for second order autocorrelation, (vii) all estimations calculated using DPD package for Ox. Note. (i) Dependent variable: log of export; all independent variables with the exception of numbers of H/F firms in region/industry are in log form, (ii) all equations include industry dummies, time dummies and a constant, (iii) heteroscedastic consistent standard errors in brackets, (iv) *** denotes significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 10% level, (v) instruments include some or all available moment restrictions of the endogenous explanatory variables, (vi) AR (2) is the ArellanoBond test for second order autocorrelation, (vii) all estimations calculated using DPD package for Ox.
